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Introduction
The strength, the solvency, the influence of Britain…are going to depend…
to a unique extent on the speed with which we come to terms with the 
world of change.  There is no more dangerous illusion than the comfortable 
doctrine that the world owes us a living…that whatever we do, whenever 
we run into trouble, we can always rely on a special relationship with 
someone or other to bail us out.  From now on Britain will have as much 
influence in the world as we can earn, as we can deserve.  We have 
no accumulated reserves on which to live (Wilson, 1964, p. 14).
So began Harold Wilson’s, often misquoted, ‘white heat of technologi-
cal revolution’ speech given to the Labour Party’s Annual Conference in 
1963.  Arguably Wilson’s most significant speech, it offered a vision of the 
future based on the impact of scientific and technological progress.  As 
well as offering an alternative to the jaded approach of Harold Macmil-
lan’s Conservative Government, it also provided a new ideological basis 
for the Labour Party - freeing the Party from the electorate’s perceptions 
which associated Labour with post-war austerity and nationalisation 
and embracing a new spirit of progress in tune with the times.  The 
speech provided the Labour Party with the ideological wherewithal to 
win the 1964 General Election – albeit with a wafer-thin majority.   
This article explores the origins of Wilson’s speech and it’s linkages to the 
ideas of the popular novelist C. P .Snow – basically a belief in the possibili-
ties of generalised human progress – measured in terms of health, prosperity 
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and life-expectancy and  based on a combina-
tion of appropriate and relevant education 
and the application of applied science.  First, 
however some background to the period – a 
period when post-war austerity was rapidly 
giving way to rampant consumerism.
Background – the post-war years
Britain emerged from the Second World 
War exhausted and impoverished but with 
certain advantages compared to its war dam-
aged competitors – most notably Germany 
and France.  In civil aviation, for example, 
Britain was a global leader and retained more 
or less captive markets in what remained 
of the Empire.  Similarly, in the automotive 
industry the country possessed a number 
of leading manufacturers and this was also 
the case in numerous other industries such 
as machine tools, chemicals and glass. The 
war had massively enhanced the power of 
the trade unions as labour shortages and 
the urgent need to maintain high levels of 
output prompted government to ‘incorpo-
rate’ union leaders into the apparatus of the 
state.  Most prominently Ernest Bevin, the 
leader of the Transport and General Work-
ers’ Union, sat in Churchill’s War Cabinet 
occupying a position second only to the Prime 
Minister himself – a ‘trick’ Wilson attempted 
to repeat by bringing TGWU leader Frank 
Cousins into his government in 1964.  This 
‘collaboration’, as it was viewed in some 
quarters of the labour movement, generated 
protest – most notably in the form of a shop 
stewards’ movement opposed to the national 
unions and often left leaning or even Com-
munist in terms of ideological commitment.  
In the years immediately following the war 
the Labour Government initiated a nationali-
sation programme which saw whole areas of 
the economy brought into public ownership.  
At the same time the government established 
the National Health Service and used local 
councils as agents of centrally determined pol-
icy to supply and administer many elements 
of the welfare state such as education, housing 
and other social services.  In the long term the 
commitment to the NHS, and the welfare state 
in general, was to prove immensely costly 
and difficult to sustain.  Although attitudes 
to public ownership shifted from time to time 
depending on the flux of political opinion, 
the general trend for the thirty years after 
the war was to accept the so called post war 
consensus and sustain a ‘mixed economy’.  
Similarly, a desire to maintain high levels 
of employment remained common ground 
between the main UK political parties and 
Keynesian economic policy was generally 
accepted as providing the route map to its 
achievement.  The very high levels of regional 
unemployment experienced between the wars 
provided the backdrop for post-war politics - 
the Conservatives heavy defeat in 1945 being 
largely attributed to their apparent ‘inaction’ 
on unemployment during their years of office 
in the 1920s and 30s – and influenced govern-
ment policy in terms of ‘directing’ industry 
to vulnerable regions.  A rule of thumb myth 
emerged which asserted that any Government 
presiding over in excess of 1 million unem-
ployed would never be re-elected – a myth 
eventually exposed as such in the 1980s when 
unemployment rose to over 3 million but the 
Conservatives were nevertheless re-elected. 
The assumptions relating to work in the 
1950s were straightforward.  Britain was an 
industrial country, a place where factories 
were commonplace and environmental pol-
lution an accepted part of everyday life.  A 
generation that had experienced the insecuri-
ties of the 1930s and the impact of two world 
wars wanted jobs and the quality of the jobs 
was hardly an issue. Jobs were plentiful and 
the mood of the country optimistic in spite 
of a diminishing role in the world and the 
on-going retreat from Empire. However, 
a generation was growing-up which had 
not experienced the 1930s or the threat and 
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actuality of war and desired/demanded 
more from life than a ‘dead-end’ industrial 
job in a factory.  In a famous speech in 1957 
the then Prime Minister, Harold Macmil-
lan, made the claim that ‘most of our people 
have never had it so good’ and he was prob-
ably correct.  Post-war austerity was a thing 
of the past and people were eager to enjoy 
the emerging consumer society and the 
products advertised nightly on the newly 
introduced commercial TV.  Credit facilities 
were expanded and ownership of consumer 
durables ranging from refrigerators to auto-
mobiles became commonplace.  The decline of 
the British sea-side resorts began as more and 
more people enjoyed continental holidays.  
American youth culture began to dominate 
the thinking of the newly discovered ‘teenag-
ers’.  Having said this, however, embedded in 
Macmillan’s speech were some clear warnings 
relating to wages, inflation and employ-
ment – matters which would become major 
issues over the next thirty years and beyond.  
By the 1960s there was a growing body of 
opinion which claimed that full employment 
and extensive unionisation were linked to 
wage inflation and low levels of productiv-
ity.  Fear of recession and unemployment had, 
for the moment at least, been substantially 
removed and policy makers were attracted to 
alternative forms of pay restraint – effectively 
intervening directly in the labour market 
through the imposition of incomes policy; 
a policy that was to prove the undoing of a 
succession of governments in the 1960s and 
70s. Meanwhile, however, attitudes to work 
and jobs were changing.  The so called ‘killer 
smog’ of 1952 had led to the Clean Air Act 
1956 and a sort of proto-environmentalism 
was stirring.  It was no longer quite accept-
able to build factories on local street corners 
and, encouraged by the construction of New 
Towns, industry began to relocate to areas 
far removed from the urban centres to cus-
tom built facilities many miles away.  In the 
same time frame the school leaving age had 
risen from 14 years to 15 in 1947 and young 
people were entering the jobs market with 
slightly raised aspirations and no longer 
prepared to be the ‘deferential workers’ of 
the past.  Apprenticeships began their long 
period of decline and the ending of National 
Service in 1960 killed the final resistance to 
the emerging youth culture – a culture more 
concerned with spending than saving. 
Although in the 1950s the world of work 
remained much as it had existed between 
the wars, new technologies were developing 
which threatened the old, labour intensive 
industries of the past.  Applied science was 
poised to become ever more important and 
industrial R&D ever more crucial to economic 
success in emerging industries such as com-
puters, atomic energy, telecommunication, 
electronics and pharmaceuticals.  In the USA, 
for example, RCA Laboratories had carried 
out the pioneering work on colour televi-
sion during the 1940s (launching the service 
in 1951) and produced the first germanium 
transistor for consumer electronics in 1952. 
Meanwhile, Germany and Japan had made a 
remarkable recovery from the destruction of 
the war.  The former in automotive, chemicals 
and electrical goods, the latter in automo-
tive but also in electronics where Japanese 
manufacturers successfully produced vast 
quantities of cheap transistor radios – by 
1959 Japan was exporting 6 million radios 
a year to the USA and proportionally as 
many to Britain.  The old order was rapidly 
changing and it was in this context that C. P. 
Snow gave his famous, notoriously contro-
versial and lastingly influential Rede Lecture 
The Two Cultures in Cambridge in 1959.  
C. P. Snow discovers the ‘two cultures’
Charles Percy (C.P.) Snow began his 
career as a scientist.  He attended Leicester’s 
University College where he took a First in 
chemistry in 1927 and an MSc. in physics in 
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1928, before gaining a scholarship to Cam-
bridge as a research student, completing a 
PhD in Physics in 1930 and becoming a Fel-
low of Christ’s College in the same year. He 
began his literary career whilst still a student 
and published his first novel in 1932.  Cam-
bridge and science form the background to 
several of Snow’s books – most prominently 
The Masters (1951) and The New Men (1954), 
the latter dealing with the development of 
Britain’s atomic bomb, and The Physicists 
(published posthumously in 1981).  His most 
famous work The Corridors of Power was 
published in 1964 and it can be argued that 
it was during the late 1950s and early 60s 
that Snow achieved the height of his literary 
powers and influence.  Snow was a self-
declared progressive; a ‘man of the left’ who, 
in spite of a somewhat pessimistic world 
view, took an optimistic view of the future – a 
future underwritten by the possibilities for 
human progress offered by applied science.
In his Rede Lecture, Snow claimed that 
the developed nations, including Britain, 
were entering a new, science based, industrial 
era which he characterised as a ‘scientific 
revolution’, qualitatively distinct from the 
industrial revolution which had preceded 
it and characterised by ‘discontinuous 
change’.  Given Britain’s particular heritage 
this would prove particularly challeng-
ing.  As he put it, comparing the industrial 
revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries 
with what was occurring in the 20th:-
...by the industrial revolution, I mean the 
gradual use of machines, the employment 
of men and women in factories, the change 
in this country from a population mainly 
of agricultural labourers to a population 
mainly engaged in making things in factories 
….Out of it grew another change, closely 
related to the first, but far more scientific, far 
quicker, and probably far more prodigious 
in its result.  This change comes from the 
application of real science to industry….I 
believe the industrial society of electronics, 
atomic energy, automation, is in cardinal 
respects different in kind from anything that 
has gone before, and will change the world 
much more.  It is this transformation that, 
in my view, is entitled to the name scientific 
revolution. (Snow, 1959/1971, pp. 30-1).  
Snow saw Britain as singularly ill equipped 
to respond to the multitude of changes that 
this revolution would inevitably bring.  Not 
least he claimed that the country’s educa-
tional system was not providing the rising 
generation with the essential knowledge and 
skills necessary to cope in a world where an 
understanding and appreciation of science, 
applied science, technology and engineering 
would be crucial.  This inadequacy, he argued, 
could be largely attributed to the influence of 
the intellectuals and specifically the ‘literary 
intellectuals’ with their abiding hostility to 
industrialisation - as he put it, ‘intellectuals, 
in particular literary intellectuals, are natural 
Luddites’.  In Snow’s view, ‘two cultures’ 
had emerged – the one scientific, optimistic 
and attuned to the modern world; the other 
literary, pessimistic, hostile to the modern 
world but nevertheless possessing an inordi-
nate and unjustifiable amount of influence. 
According to Snow, the huge social changes 
wrought by the industrial revolution had been 
more or less ignored, or viewed with a sort 
of snobbish disdain, by the prevailing 19th 
century cultural elite (what he termed the ‘tra-
ditional culture’) – who at the same time had 
gained immense material advantage from the 
wealth this revolution had generated.  Hence, 
the first wave of the industrial revolution 
crept on, without anyone noticing what was 
happening.  It was, of course – or at least 
destined to become….by far the biggest 
transformation in society since the beginning 
of agriculture….But the traditional culture 
didn’t notice: or when it did notice, didn’t 
like what it saw….The traditional culture 
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became more abstracted from it as it became 
more wealthy. (Snow, 1959/1971, p. 26)
According to Snow, this failure by Britain’s 
cultural elite to engage with the true ‘spirit 
of the age’ (Zeitgeist) but instead retreat into 
an illusory world of rural idylls and self-
indulgent pessimism had cost the country 
its industrial edge in the 19th century.  As he 
saw it, Britain was currently poised to repeat 
this error unless what we might now term 
a massive ‘paradigm shift’ were to occur 
in social attitudes and educational provi-
sion.  In Snow’s view the key, perhaps the 
only, means to bring this about, and ensure 
thereby Britain’s survival as a prosperous 
nation, was to train more scientists, engineers 
and technicians capable of understanding 
and promoting the scientific revolution.  
Snow’s lecture, subsequently published 
as The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution, generated massive interest and 
caused a huge furore, with supporters and 
opponents taking sides in what became an 
international debate.  Most prominently he 
was subjected to a virulent personal attack 
by a now more or less forgotten Cambridge 
literary critic called F.R. Leavis.  In 1963 
Snow responded to all of this, but not to 
Leavis directly, in The Two Cultures: A Sec-
ond Look, in which he provided a précis 
of his argument in the following terms:-
In our society…we have lost the pretence 
of a common culture….This is serious for 
our creative, intellectual and, above all, our 
moral life.  It is leading us to interpret the 
past wrongly, to misjudge the present, and 
to deny our hopes for the future….I gave 
as the most pointed example of this lack of 
communication in the shape of two groups of 
people, representing what I have christened 
‘the two cultures’.  One of these contained the 
scientists, whose weight, achievement and 
influence did not need stressing.  The other 
contained the literary intellectuals (who) 
represent, vocalise, and to some extent shape 
and predict the mood of the non-scientific 
culture: they do not make the decisions, but 
their words seep into the minds of those who 
do.  Between these two groups – the scientists 
and the literary intellectuals – there is little 
communication and, instead of fellow-feeling, 
something like hostility (and he went on) There 
is, of course no complete solution….But we 
can do something.  The chief means open to 
us is education – education mainly in primary 
and secondary schools, but also in colleges 
and universities.  There is no excuse for letting 
another generation be as vastly ignorant, or as 
devoid of understanding and sympathy, as we 
are ourselves. (Snow, 1963/1971, pp. 51-2).
Harold Wilson and the ‘scientific  
revolution’
History has not been kind to Harold Wilson 
and it is difficult now to strip away the dam-
age his reputation sustained during his years 
as Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970 and from 
1974 to 76 and see him as he appeared in 1963, 
the year he became leader of the Labour Party. 
In 1963 Wilson was 47 years old and, by the 
standards of the times, very much the bright 
young man.  Although he had won a scholar-
ship to Jesus College, Oxford where he was 
academically outstanding and became one of 
the youngest dons at the age of 21 in 1937, he 
never changed his Yorkshire accent – choosing 
instead to maintain ‘the common touch’.  He 
was a Research Fellow at University College 
under the then Master, William Beveridge – 
so called ‘father of the welfare state’ – and 
continued to work with him as a temporary 
civil servant on the outbreak of war in 1939.  
His work with Beveridge stimulated Wilson’s 
passion for statistics and he later became 
Director of Economics and Statistics at the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power where he wrote a 
paper on the future of the British coal indus-
try.  Wilson’s capacity for hard work and 
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mastery of detail made him a successful civil 
servant and his academic career was more or 
less assured.  However, just as Snow’s true 
vocation was writing, Wilson’s was politics.
Wilson was elected as Labour MP for 
Ormskirk in 1945 (moving to Huyten in 1950) 
in the Labour landslide of that year and made 
rapid progress – becoming President of the 
Board of Trade in 1947 and the youngest mem-
ber of the Cabinet in the 20th century at the 
age of 31.  Labour lost power in 1951 and Wil-
son positioned himself on the left of the Party 
– an associate of Aneurin Bevan the so called 
‘father of the NHS’ – although he did not sup-
port Bevan in the leadership election of 1955 
opting instead for the right wing candidate, 
Hugh Gaitskell. Gaitskell appointed Wilson to 
the Shadow Cabinet and made him Shadow 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and, following 
the Labour Party’s defeat in the General Elec-
tion of 1959, Shadow Foreign Secretary.  When 
Gaitskell died suddenly in 1963, Wilson was 
elected as Leader of the Labour Party, becom-
ing Leader of the Opposition at a very low 
point in the fortunes of the governing Con-
servatives led by the ailing Harold Macmillan.
Snow and Wilson, in spite of the ten years 
difference in their ages, had much in com-
mon.  Both were hard-working, ambitious, 
provincial scholarship boys – academically 
successful and upwardly mobile.  Both were 
driven by the fear of failure inherited from the 
insecurities of their parents’ lives – treading a 
very narrow line between lower middle class 
respectability and disaster.  Snow’s father had 
been made bankrupt and Wilson’s father had 
experienced periods of unemployment – fail-
ure and the ‘half-life’ of genteel poverty are 
constant themes in Snow’s fiction and Wilson 
often referred to the threat of unemploy-
ment.  Both men were successful temporary 
civil servants during the Second World War; 
Wilson, as has been seen, at the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power and Snow the Ministry of 
Labour – Wilson being awarded an OBE and 
Snow a CBE for their services.  Both were 
technocrats and, in Snow’s words, ‘new men’.  
Finally, both men were ‘tender’ towards the 
Soviet Union – if not that country’s political 
system then certainly its country’s apparent 
successful application of economic planning.  
Wilson and Snow had a mutual friend, or at 
least associate, in the distinguished physicist 
Patrick Blackett., a Nobel Prize winner in 
1948 and Head of the Physics Department at 
IC from 1953-63 – hence the Blackett Labora-
tory.  Blackett was a key influence on Wilson’s 
thinking on science and technology during the 
1950s.  In the words of Wilson’s biographer:-
Blackett joined a group which met at the 
Reform Club to discuss the formation of 
a scientific and technological policy for 
the nation, and for Labour in particular.  
Membership of the group included a glittering 
array of leading British scientists…(together 
with the author) C.P. Snow….Leading 
Labour front-benchers – Gaitskell, Callaghan, 
Robens – sometimes came to meetings.  None, 
however, took as much interest as Wilson 
(whose) conception of the scientific revolution 
entailed much more than subsidizing 
scientists and laboratories: it meant harnessing 
talent, employing professionals rather than 
amateurs, promoting on merit, abolishing the 
old boys’ network, educating the ambitious, 
creating a ladder for people from average 
backgrounds to climb (Pimlott, 1992, p.274-5).
So when Wilson stood up to give his 
speech to the Labour Party Conference 
in Scarborough in October 1963 he had a 
clear vision for the future.  He was also 
aware that technological changes were 
occurring which would sweep away much 
existing technology and prove a potent 
threat to jobs.  As he put it, discerning the 
emergence of ‘advanced manufacturing’:-
We have to recognise that automation is 
not just one more process in the history of 
mechanisation, if by mechanisation we mean 
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the application of technology to eliminate 
the need for human muscle.  The essence 
of modern automation is that it replaces 
the hitherto unique human functions of 
memory and of judgement.  And now the 
computers have reached the point where 
they command facilities of memory beyond 
the capacity of any human being or group 
of human beings who have ever lived….In 
America technological change is beginning to 
move now even more rapidly in white collar 
professions than in engineering….let us be clear 
in America today and Britain tomorrow we 
face massive redundancies in office work no 
less than industry. (Wilson, 1964, pp. 16-17).
Wilson then went on to outline a policy 
for the future based on a new formulation of 
Socialism based on a combination of science, 
technological development, education and 
planning.  In many ways what he was offering 
was an extension of the war-time approach to 
industry he had experienced as a civil serv-
ant, combined with some of the evolutionary 
ideas of Fabian Socialism.  Of course, planning 
requires control of the economy and, although 
this was might be possible under conditions 
of total war, it was to prove impossible in 
the circumstances of the 1960s. Not least 
organised labour, in the shape of the trade 
union movement, were unlikely to lay aside 
sectional interests for any length of time, par-
ticularly in circumstances of rising prices and 
growing material aspirations.  Also, many of 
the technological changes described by Wilson 
were more or less certain to be resisted by the 
unions – in, for example, engineering, ship-
building, newspaper printing and the docks.  
Snow’s ‘literally intellectuals’ had nothing 
on the British trade unions when it came to 
Luddism!  Equally, business was likely to be 
deeply suspicious of exhortations from an 
incoming Labour Government still commit-
ted by definition to the ‘collective ownership 
of production, distribution and exchange’.  
Wilson’s immediate response to such doubts 
was summed up in the in a single phrase – 
‘the Britain that is going to be forged in the 
white heat of this (technological) revolution 
will be no place for restrictive practices or for 
outdated methods on either side of industry’.  
Wilson’s speech was a triumph, not merely 
in terms of uniting his own Party, but also in 
terms of providing the ideological ammuni-
tion to contest the 1964 General Election. 
Aftermath
As has been mentioned, Labour won the 
1964 election but not with the majority Wil-
son had expected.  Although, in line with his 
Scarborough vision, he established a Ministry 
of Technology, appointing Frank Cousins 
as Minister with a seat in the Cabinet, there 
were problems from the start.  Cousins was 
placed in an almost impossible position and 
it is not surprising that he proved incapable 
of coping with the inherent contradictions 
confronting him.  As the leader of a mas-
sive trade union he had real power.  As a 
Cabinet Minister heading up a new Ministry, 
possessing no parliamentary experience 
and without any meaningful resources he 
lacked power and had only limited influence.  
As his biographer has commented:-
Cousins appointment was greeted by most 
of the newspapers with scarcely concealed 
derision, by the Parliamentary Opposition as a 
Wilsonian gimmick, and by many public voices 
as, at best, an oddity….When the Ministry of 
Technology was born on Saturday 17 October 
1964 there was nothing but a plan and a prayer.  
No headquarters, no staff, not even funds….
Having brought Cousins into the Government 
with tempting, not to say glowing, visions, of 
what might be achieved, the Prime Minister, 
finding himself swamped by the magnitude 
of the economic crisis, allowed his Minister of 
Technology to steer a lonely and inadequately 
aided course (Goodman, 1984, pp.402-3).
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As the Government grappled with the 
economic problems deriving from an over-
valued pound and the pressures of increasing 
industrial unrest, Cousins found himself asso-
ciated with policies which he could not, in all 
conscience, support.  His fundamental belief 
was in free collective bargaining whereas the 
Government were moving ever more in the 
direction of statutory incomes and he ulti-
mately resigned over the issue in July 1966. 
Meanwhile, Wilson asked C.P. Snow to 
join the new Ministry in the role of Cousin’s 
Parliamentary Secretary – a junior ministerial 
post.  Snow agreed, with the caveat that he 
could only afford a year away from his writing 
commitments, and accepted a peerage, becom-
ing Lord Snow of Leicester which enabled 
him to sit in the House of Lords and speak for 
the government there. According to Pimlott:-
Arriving at No.10 to be offered the post, 
Snow took out his notebook and said to a 
civil servant: ‘This is marvellous stuff for a 
novel’.  Snow had the virtue of being a keen 
admirer of the new Prime Minister….But he 
was approaching sixty, and had never been 
a politician.  The error of giving both jobs 
in the ideologically key ministry to people 
who had no experience of the Westminster 
jungle rapidly became apparent….Snow’s 
appointment was largely a token one, well-
meaning if ill-judged. (Pimlott, 1992, p. 328).  
Snow eventually resigned from his 
post in April 1966 to return to his writing.  
Not surprisingly perhaps his penulti-
mate novel In Their Wisdom is largely set 
in the House of Lords.  Harold Wilson 
won the 1966 General Election with an 
increased majority, lost the election of 1970 
but returned to win two elections in 1974 
before finally resigning as Prime Minister 
in 1976.  In a recent book Nicholas Comfort 
summed up the Wilson era as follows:-
Wilson’s commitment to a Britain forged 
in the white heat of technology was music 
to the ears of scientists and managers who, 
while conscious that British industry and 
technology no longer claimed global primacy, 
remained confident that the country had the 
economic and intellectual resource base – and 
the products – to compete.  On the face of 
it good times lay ahead.  Other indicators 
were telling a different story….Handicapped 
by an overvalued currency, Britain was 
losing ground in export markets: between 
1962 and 1966 the country’s share of world 
manufactured exports fell…from 16.2% to 
12.2%.....The fifteen years that followed would 
see three changes of government – two of 
them precipitated by industrial unrest - the 
devaluation of sterling, the nationalisation 
of industries by Labour and Conservatives 
alike, rocketing inflation and unemployment, 
an upsurge of shop floor militancy, increasing 
penetration of British markets by more efficient 
and enterprising competitors….From all of 
this, British industry came out demonstrably 
weaker, with employment in manufacturing 
by 1979 down to 6.16, half what it had been 
in 1952….And to Whitehall, the ‘white heat of 
technology’ had given way to ‘the management 
of decline (Comfort, 2012, pp. 56-7).
Snow and Wilson had in their differ-
ent ways diagnosed aspects of the ‘British 
disease’.  Unfortunately, however, they 
were nowhere near to finding a cure! 
	 Snow,	Wilson	and	the	Scientific	Revolution		 9
Bibliography
Comfort, N. Surrender: How Brit-
ish Industry Gave Up the Ghost 
1952-2012, Biteback Publishing, 2012.
Gertner, J. The Idea Factory: Bell 
Labs and the Great Age of American 
Innovation, Penguin Press, 2012.
Goodman, G. The Awkward War-
rior: Frank Cousins: His Life and 
Times, Spokesman, 1984.
Pimlott, B. Harold Wilson, Harper  
Collins, 1991.
Sheldrake, J. Industrial Relations and 
Politics in Britain 1880-1989, Pinter, 1991.
Snow, C. P. The Two Cultures and the 
Scientific Revolution (1959) reprinted in  
Public Affairs, Macmillan, 1971.
Snow, C. P.  The Two Cultures: A Second  
Look (1963). 
Tredell, N. C. P. Snow: The Dynamics  
of Hope, Palgrave, 2012.
Wilson, H. Speech Opening the Science 
Debate at the Party’s Annual Conference, 
Scarborough, 1963 reprinted in Purpose in 
Politics, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.
Wilson, H. The Labour Government 
1964-70: A Personal Record, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson/Michael Joseph, 1971.
10	 Policy	Paper
	 Snow,	Wilson	and	the	Scientific	Revolution		 11
The Global Policy Institute was created in August 2006 as a 
Research Institute of London Metropolitan University. It brings 
together academics from the social sciences and business dis-
ciplines to analyse the dynamics of the post-globalisation world 
and formulate policy solutions. The Institute’s research and 
consultancy will be of direct practical use to decision-makers, 
policy formation, business users and civil society groups, and it 
will offer partnerships within and beyond the academic com-
munity.
The Global Policy Institute
London Metropolitan University
31 Jewry Street
London EC3N 2EY
United Kingdom
 
Tel +44 (0)20 7320 1355
Fax +44 (0)20 7320 3018
Email office@gpilondon.com
www.gpilondon.com
www.gpilondon.com
